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1 INTRODUCTION 
Most oil and gas well reservoirs represent a major 
source of hazardous energy, and a blowout preventer 
system (BOP) is used to prevent the escape of this en-
ergy during well drilling operations. The BOP is pri-
marily designed so that the drilling crew manually, 
upon detection, can close-in unintended inflow of res-
ervoir energy that can occur during the operations. If 
the BOP fails to close and contain the inflow the sit-
uation will escalate into what is called a well blowout. 
An offshore well blowout is not found acceptable 
across the industry. For example, the Macondo well 
blowout in 2010 caused 11 fatalities and incurred 
over 40 Billion USD in liabilities (Reuters 2012). The 
reliability of BOP systems has therefore received a 
comprehensive scrutiny in the aftermath of the Ma-
condo blowout. Most importantly, regulations and 
standards that pertain to design, qualification and use 
of BOP systems have been subject to revisions (BSEE 
2014, API 2004b, API 2012, API 2004a, PSA 2014b, 
PSA 2014a, NORSOK 2012, NORSOK 2013). In ad-
dition, new contingency measures such as well cap-
ping devices have been developed for improved 
emergency preparedness in event of potential failure 
of a subsea BOP system. 
The oil and gas industry has monitored the safety 
and reliability performance of subsea BOPs for many 
decades. Data about BOP failures during drilling op-
erations has been collected, analysed and applied as 
basis for several safety and reliability performance re-
ports published (Rausand & Engen 1983, Holand & 
Rausand 1987, Holand 1998, Quilici et al. 1998, 
Holand 1999, Holand & Skalle 2001, Jorge et al. 
2001, Jorge 2005, BSEE 2006, Sattler & Gallander 
2010, Holand & Awan 2012). Fault tree analysis 
(FTA) is seen used for the more detailed BOP relia-
bility studies, among other found in the reports by 
Holand et al. (2012, 2001, 1999), which are consid-
ered to be the most thorough. 
 Recognised industry regulations and standards re-
quire verification (testing) of BOP safety functions 
every 7 or 14 days. It is also a regulatory requirement 
to pull the BOP for repair if a safety critical failure is 
revealed during such a test. However, the unsched-
uled pulling of a BOP for repair may introduce in-
creased well blowout risk, and waivers that allow the 
drilling crew to postpone repairs are sometimes given 
by the authorities. Unfortunately, the FTA models de-
veloped in the mentioned reports apply to a static sit-
uation and do not account for the dynamic effect that 
waivers have on the well blowout risk level.  
The main objective of this paper is to present a new 
modelling approach that is more suitable in an opera-
tional context for decision-making about need for 
BOP repairs or not. The BOP closure elements are 
studied using Markov modelling in the approach with 
degraded BOP states included. The new model may 
be used to support decisions about different mainte-
nance policies, within the existing industry frames of 
the typical BOP safety availability targets (NOGA 
2004). The paper also gives a thorough definition of 
BOP operating states, as necessary to understand the 
assumptions made for the new model. 
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The main benefit of the proposed approach is a more efficient explicit trade-off analysis, where the effect of 
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2 DYNAMIC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
During well operations the BOP may be regarded as 
a dynamic system. This includes many different load 
scenario and possible transitions of the BOP into de-
graded states of operation, if one or more faults are 
revealed. Many of the previous safety and reliability 
studies of BOP systems treat the BOP as a static sys-
tem using a traditional FTA approach. This section 
gives a review of how the safety and reliability of dy-
namic systems is treated in the literature, starting with 
Hassan & Aldemir (1990) who argue that “dynamic 
methodologies are defined as those which explicitly 
account for the time element in system operation for 
failure modelling”. The definition implies focus on 
time requirements (time-line) over situation require-
ments (state/‘evidence’), which is sought for the 
safety and reliability analysis of subsea BOP systems. 
However, the use of the term ‘dynamic’ about analy-
sis has become broader in more recent years. For ex-
ample, according to Distefano & Puliafito (2009) it 
may also be system analysis that explicitly evaluates 
dependent, cascading, on-demand or common cause 
failures, and also policies for redundancy and mainte-
nance. 
Most dynamic analysis methods for large systems 
are based on the well-known ‘static’ analysis method-
ologies (Rausand & Høyland 2004). Examples of dy-
namic methods are dynamic fault tree (Čepin & 
Mavko 2002), dynamic reliability block diagram 
(Distefano & Puliafito 2009), dynamic event tree 
(Acosta & Siu 1993) and dynamic Bayesian networks 
(DBN) (Cai et al. 2013). Many of the dynamic meth-
ods retain a strong relation to the time-line for mod-
elling. However, newer methods, in particular those 
based on Bayesian theory, focus more explicitly on 
situation requirements, the existing ‘evidence’ rele-
vant to the system functionality. For example, Cai et 
al. (2013) demonstrated the application of a DBN in 
BOP reliability analysis by converting one of 
Holand’s FTA models. Another interesting class of 
dynamic reliability analysis is referred to as ‘multi-
phase’ or ‘phase mission system’ (PMS) analysis (Siu 
(1994). This is analysis where the system model con-
sists of a set of sub-models that are consecutively 
linked together over the (mission) timeline. For ex-
ample, a typical PMS model may consist of sub-mod-
els that are based on reliability block diagrams or fault 
trees, which for system analysis are linked together 
with a binary decision diagram (Lu & Wu 2014). 
The FTA and DBN models used for BOP safety 
and reliability analysis are found computational de-
manding, which makes them less suited for opera-
tional use. Also, the FTA and DBN approaches are 
complex and discipline oriented. Hence, as a repre-
sentation of a system or process it is viewed (cur-
rently) to lack the ‘communication features’ needed 
for risk control in a multidisciplinary operational set-
ting (Rasmussen 1997).  
Similar to a PMS model the BOP safety and relia-
bility analysis model presented in this paper is based 
on a recursive multiphase Markov approach that in-
cludes a stationary transition rate matrix that can be 
solved by numerical methods. The multiphase Mar-
kov method presented constitutes a detailed model for 
the BOP system closure elements, but may also be 
used as a simplified and compact representation of the 
entire subsea BOP system. 
3 SUBSEA BOP SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Description of subsea BOP system elements 
The main BOP safety function is to close-in and con-
trol unintended inflow of reservoir energy that can oc-
cur during the well operations. The subsea BOP sys-
tem is made up of three main subsystems to achieve 
this function (The Deepwater Horizon Study Group 
2011): 1) Control system that distributes hydraulic 
power fluid from hydraulic power unit and accumu-
lator banks used for activation of BOP closure ele-
ments. The control systems found are based on two 
principles; electro-hydraulic (‘multiplex’) or pilot hy-
draulic (‘all hydraulic’). 2) Lower marine riser pack-
age (LMRP) that provides the ability to connect and 
disconnect the drilling riser (rig) from the BOP stack. 
For example if bad weather conditions or in a ‘drive-
off’/‘drift-off’ situation with a dynamic positioned 
(DP) rig. 3) The BOP stack that connects and seal the 
BOP to the wellhead and includes a ‘stack’ of main 
BOP closure elements for well close-in, within ca. 30-
45 seconds, during different well control situations.  
There are three different types of BOP closure ele-
ments available for activation in a well control situa-
tion; 1) Annular preventer (AP): A ‘rubber donut’ that 
is compressed during activation. AP has the ability to 
seal-off annulus outside all sizes of pipe running 
through the BOP. Some AP elements can also seal off 
the well if there is no pipe, but then at a reduced pres-
sure rating. AP is the primary element that is activated 
during drilling operations. The AP elements are nor-
mally located in the LMRP. 2) Pipe ram (PR): two 
opposing ‘ram blocks’ with slips and seals that hold 
the pipe in place and seal-off the annulus outside. A 
PR element is designed for specific size of drill-pipe. 
A variable bore ram (VBR) is term used for a PR ele-
ment designed for a range of drill-pipe sizes. 3) Blind 
shear ram (BSR); two opposing ‘ram blocks’ with a 
cutting edges and seals that will shear specific sizes 
of drill-pipe and seal off the well. It is common for a 
subsea BOP stack to have one BSR. Some BOP 
stacks have a second non-sealing casing shear ram 
(CSR) designed to cut larger diameter pipe. 
The subsea BOP closure elements are all in an open 
and dormant position during normal well operations 
not to impede the activities. On basis of how the ele-
ments are activated we may define five distinct modes 
of BOP operation: 
1. Intervention – Manual. An underwater remote op-
erated vessel (ROV) can be used to override BOP-
functions through ROV tool interface(s) on the 
BOP stack. 
2. Normal – Manual. This is the main BOP opera-
tional mode where the drilling crew relates to the 
situation on the rig floor and the two central BOP 
control panels. 
3. Emergency – Manual disconnect sequence 
(EDS). The activation of at least one blind shear 
ram to seal off the well and disconnection of the 
LMRP from the BOP stack. 
4. Emergency – Autoshear. The automatic activa-
tion of at least one blind shear ram if the LMRP 
disconnects spuriously. 
5. Emergency - Automatic Mode Function (AMF / 
‘deadman’). The EDS sequence triggered auto-
matically in situations with loss of power and 
communication between the rig and the BOP. 
3.2 Regulations and standards 
The most internationally recognised regulations for 
design, operation and maintenance of subsea BOP 
systems is provided by the United States Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The 
BSEE regulations refer to domestic industry stand-
ards; API Spec 16A, API Spec 16D and API Std 53 
for guidance on how to fulfil requirements. The fol-
lowing main requirements are found related to subsea 
BOP system design in the BSEE’s federal regulations 
(BSEE 2014) 
‐ Two redundant BOP control panels whereof one 
panel on the drilling floor. 
‐ At least four remote controlled BOP rams/ pre-
venters, thereof: One AP, two PR/VBR (for each 
size of drill-pipe used) and one BSR. BSR to 
shear any type drill-pipe/work-string/tubing. 
‐ Independent dual pod-control system for opera-
tion 
‐ Accumulators that provide ‘fast closure’ (emer-
gency mode) of the BOP components in case of 
loss of power fluid connection to the surface 
‐ ROV intervention capability (intervention mode) 
for override of minimum one PR/VBR, one BSR 
and the LMRP connector (disconnect). 
‐ Autoshear and deadman systems for DP rigs 
(emergency mode) 
‐ Side outlets on the BOP stack for a separate kill 
and choke lines. Each outlet with at least two re-
mote controlled and full-opening valves. Install a 
choke line outlet above the bottom ram and a kill 
line outlet below the bottom ram. 
 
In Norway, the Petroleum Safety Authority Nor-
way (PSA) refers to NORSOK standard D-001 
(NORSOK 2012) to meet requirements stipulated for 
equipment used in well drilling operations. There are 
some differences in requirements between BSEE and 
PSA. In comparison to the BSEE regulations as the 
main reference for such systems the following is 
noted in the Norwegian regulations: 
‐ BOP control system that meet recommendations 
in OLF 070 (NOGA 2004), which stipulates SIL 
2 requirements (IEC 2010) for closure of PR/VBR 
or BSR in two defined well control situations. 
‐ LMRP disconnection system that secures well 
and disengages the riser before a critical riser an-
gle occurs. 
‐ Two shear rams where at least one is capable of 
sealing. 
‐ For DP vessels; Shear ram that can shear casing 
and drill-pipe tool joints / heavy walled pipe. 
‐ For mobile offshore drilling units the BOP shall 
be equipped with two annular preventers. 
 
An illustration of two main BOP closure element 
configurations from the regulations and experience 
data is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Example of BOP closure element configurations 
3.3 Operation and maintenance 
After the BOP installation testing the BSEE provides 
requirements to BOP function- and pressure testing 
every 7 and 14 days during the well operations. The 
BOP closure elements require pressure testing (14 
days) for verification of both closure and seal for rel-
evant well load scenario, but reliability data collected 
shows that most control system failures are revealed 
by function tests (Sattler and Gallander, 2010). 
3.4 Summary 
Seven distinct BOP well isolation (close-in) scenario 
has been identified from a technical review, which 
also are illustrated in Figure 2. Note that 1ooN de-
notes a system that functions as long as at least one 
out of total of N elements are functioning; 
‐ 1a) Low well pressure scenario with drill-pipe in 
hole: Isolation of annulus with AP or PR/VBR el-
ements available (1oo3, 1oo4, 1oo5) 
‐ 1b) Low well pressure scenario with casing in 
hole: Isolation of annulus with AP elements avail-
able (1oo1, 1oo2) 
‐ 2) Drill-pipe in hole: Isolation of annulus with 
PR/VBR elements available (1oo2, 1oo3) 
‐ 3a) Low well pressure scenario with no pipe in 
hole: Isolation of well with AP or BSR elements 
available (1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3) 
‐ 3b) No pipe in hole: Isolation of well with BSR 
element available (1oo1) 
‐ 4a) Drill-pipe in hole: Automatic isolation of well 
with BSR element available (1oo1) 
‐ 4b) Casing in hole: Automatic isolation of well 
(Not evaluated) 
 
 
4 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
4.1 Modelling basis and experience data 
A safety and reliability model must reflect the system 
in those aspects that are of importance to produce 
trustworthy results. For guidance on model validity 
independent on well isolation scenario, Table 1 pre-
sents a list of the historically most severe, safety crit-
ical BOP system failures from Holand & Awan 
(2012), Holand (1999) and BSEE (2013). The data in-
dicate the control system as a potential source for 
common cause failures (CCF). Also of main interest 
is TAR project no. 455 (BSEE 2004) stating that the 
BSR may fail in 50% of the times when attempting to 
shear pipe during actual operations. On same subject 
Holand and Awan reports (2012): “In the Phase I 
deep-water study, a failed to shear pipe occurred dur-
ing an emergency disconnect. For the two emergency 
disconnect situations observed in this study, the BSR 
successfully cut the pipe and sealed off the well”.  
 
Item and failure mode MTTF* 
(BOP days) 
MTTF* 
(Item days) 
Wellhead connector - External 
leakage (2of) 11128 11128 
LMRP connector - Spurious dis-
connect (2of) 11128 11128 
LMRP connector - Failure to dis-
connect on command (3of) 7419 7419 
Control system - Total loss of 
BOP control (by the main con-
trol system) (7of) 3179** 3179 
Control module (POD), single - 
Total loss of POD functions 
(20of) 1113 2226 
Control PODs (2of) - Simultane-
ous loss of one function in both 
PODs (6of) 3709** 3709 
BSR - Leakage in closed posi-
tion (4of) 5564 6276 
BSR - Failure to close on com-
mand (1of) 22256 25104 
BSR - Failure to shear pipe in 
LMRP disconnect situation (1of) NA NA 
BSR - Spurious closure (1of) 22256 25104 
PR/VBR - Leakage in closed po-
sition (7of) 3179 8613 
PR/VBR - Failure to close on 
command (2of) 11128 30147 
PR/VBR - Failure to open on 
command (2of) 11128 30147 
AP - Leakage in closed position 
(11of) 2023 3704 
AP - Failure to close on com-
mand (1of) 22256 40748 
Isolation valve on choke and kill 
line out-let - External leak (1of) 22256 NA 
Choke and kill line - External 
leaks (Note; presumably down-
stream the isolation valves on 
BOP stack outlet) (13of) 1712 NA 
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Figure 2. BOP closure demand scenario 
Table 1. Overview of critical subsea BOP system failure modes 
with relevant reliability data based on (Holand 1999, Holand & 
Awan 2012) 
Flexible joint (item is located 
above LMRP, and not part of 
well barrier envelope) - External 
leakage (2of) 11128 11128 
*) Based on average BOP ram/preventer configurations in datasets. Total of 
22256 BOP (installation) days and 482 wells drilled. 
**) Produces an estimated CCF average rate of less than 1/22256 = 4.5E-5 /BOP 
day for rams and preventers (λCCF). Note respectively ~13/22256 = 5.8E-4 /BOP 
day for control system failures. 
4.2 Basis for new approach 
A BOP closure demand from unintended inflow of 
reservoir energy into the well may occur at random 
due to insufficient mud density, mud losses, riser fail-
ure, spurious disconnect of LMRP, or DP rig drive-
off or drift-off. Aside relevant action from the drilling 
crew, the probability of a loss of well control (‘blow-
out’) in such situations will be equal to the probability 
of failure on demand (PFD) of the BOP. If we assume 
that the demands follow a homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess (HPP), with a known rate γ, it is straight forward 
to model the associated well blowout frequency. By 
combining the HPP with the binomial situation, the 
number NBO(t) of blowouts caused by the demand in 
the time interval [0, t) will be a new HPP with fre-
quency PFD  (Rausand & Høyland 2004). The 
probability that a drilling operation will ‘survive’ an 
operations length of, say 60 days, without a blowout 
is thus given by: 
 
60Pr("survive 60 days")=e PFD     
 
Most of the safety critical BOP failure modes are 
hidden, and regular function- or pressure testing is 
carried out to reveal such failures. The safety and re-
liability performance of a proof tested system is often 
measured by the average PFD, AVGPFD . The AVGPFD  
is mainly influenced by two parameters: (i) the rate of 
hidden failures of BOP elements (λDU), and (ii) the 
interval between two consecutive tests ( ). For a sys-
tem of several BOP closure elements, the AVGPFD  be-
comes (Rausand 2014): 
 
0
11 ( )AVG SPFD R t dt

     
 
where Rs(t) denotes the reliability (‘structure’) func-
tion of the BOP closure element configuration. 
 Assuming regular test intervals and perfect repairs, 
we may assume that the AVGPFD  takes the same value 
in all intervals, and AVGPFD  is thus the probability of 
the BOP failing to close at any time. Rausand (2014) 
presents simplified formulas for 1ooN systems of N 
identical elements subject to independent failures and 
CCFs (λCCF). For 1ooN BOP element configurations 
shown in Figure 3 we get: 
 
 ( )
( 1) 2
N
DU CCF
AVGPFD N
        
 
For instance, if we assume 1oo2, λDU = 1/627 (days), 
τ = 14 days, and λCCF = 1/22256 (days) we get 
AVGPFD  = 4.8E-4. Alternatively, with λDU = 1/1173 we get AVGPFD  = 3.6E-4. For 1oo3 with same input we get AVGPFD  = 3.2E-4. The failure rate assumed, λDU, is based on the overall MTTF data provided for 
AP element in Holand and Awan (2012), and appear 
conservative to the safety critical MTTF presented in 
Table 1. However, the AP input data is selected for 
purpose of the case studies, based on the conservative 
view that closure element failure always cause im-
pairment of the element safety functions if a needed 
repair is postponed.  
The AVGPFD  formula presented is based on a num-ber of assumptions, which of main are: 
1. The failure rate of the BOP elements are identical 
and independent of time. Several BOP elements 
are, however, non-identical (an AP is not the same 
as a PR/VBR or BSR) 
2. All failures are detected during the proof test and 
within a negligible period of time. This assump-
tion is clearly not valid for the BSR. The cutting 
of pipe and sealing is not (for obvious reasons) 
part of regular tests. However, every 3 to 5 year 
the BSR is ‘overhauled’, and it may be assumed 
that most deficiencies that could result in cut and 
sealing failure are revealed then. If Taylor series 
approximation still holds, λ·τ < 0.01, we may use 
time between overhauls as the ‘test interval’ of the 
shear function. However, care should be taken 
since the experience data indicates a high PFD of 
the BSR in an actual shear-demand situation. 
3. All items are repaired to “as good as new” condi-
tion within a negligible period of time after failure 
detection. This is not always the case, or desira-
ble, since it is possible in some cases to postpone 
repair of the BOP (‘waivers given’).  
4.3 New approach based on multiphase Markov  
Reference is made to the BOP closure demand sce-
nario presented in Figure 2. A Markov model will al-
low the modelling of a degraded BOP system, but the 
number of elements to consider must also be re-
stricted to avoid an undesired state explosion. The 
main idea behind the new approach is to incorporate 
the effects on well safety of postponing repairs, taking 
into account that BOP configurations have many re-
dundant BOP closure elements. A similar multiphase 
Markov model, but with another application area, has 
been developed and discussed by Welte (2008). 
The Markov model in the approach is illustrated in 
Figure 3. In the model we assume N number of iden-
tical redundant BOP closure elements. ML denotes 
the maintenance level, which represents the degree of 
allowable degradation, the number of revealed fail-
ures, before the BOP is pulled for repair. I.e., the BOP 
will be pulled to surface for overhaul and full renewal 
(perfect repair) if the total number of revealed failures 
reaches or exceeds the ML value. Noted is bounds for 
the model with ML = 1 that equals a 1ooN system, 
and ML = N that equals a system that is not repaired 
until all redundant elements have revealed failures. 
The model is made recursive, so that a numerical rou-
tine can be implemented to automatically solve over 
many inspection intervals within the total BOP instal-
lation period on the well. 
According to Chapman-Kolmogorov’s equation 
the Markov model in Figure 3 is given with N+1 
states as (Rausand 2014): 
 
P(t) · A = P'(t)   
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Where the P(t) vector includes the distribution of the 
probability mass between the states at any time t, and 
hence; P0(t)+P1(t)+ … +PN(t) = 1 is required for t ≥ 0. 
In the transition rate matrix A, we have ,i k , for i ≠ k, 
denoting the incoming transition rate from state i to 
state k. If no possible transition from state i to state k 
then ,i k  = 0. Respectively, ,k j , j ≠ k, denote out-
going transition rate from state k to state j. If no pos-
sible transition exist from state j to state k then ,k j = 
0. As illustrated in Figure 3 the approach uses a sta-
tionary A with transition rates 1,  N N DU CCF    , 
and otherwise not equal to 0 for i = [0, 1, …, (N-1)] 
given by: 
,
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The start conditions will resemble a continuous time 
Markov chain model with all probability mass located 
in state 0, P0(0) = 1. State 0 will represent the “as good 
as new” condition of all N redundant BOP closure el-
ements. From the Markov property, P(t)A=P'(t), that 
is valid between inspection times we may use the fol-
lowing to numerically solve the movement in the 
state’s probability mass (Rausand 2014):  
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Further, iteratively at each inspection point τi we 
move all the probability mass from states; PML(τ), 
P(ML+1)(τ), … P(N)(τ) and add this back to state 0. This 
produces the new start conditions P(0') for this period 
(phase) till the next inspection time and so forth until 
the mission time is reached. A typical mission time 
will be 60-70 days for a BOP. I.e., the BOP is then 
pulled to surface for maintenance and preparations for 
use on the next well. 
Based on the approach, we may directly produce 
for decision support (i) the PFD and thereof AVGPFD
: The PFD of 1ooN configuration is equal to PN(t), (ii) 
the probability of having to pull the BOP at inspection 
point τi, which is equal to the  N m
L
i
m M
P 

 . The PFD 
result from model can for instance be combined with 
a control system PFD analysis for verification of SIL 
2 requirement ( AVGPFD  < 1E-2) as stipulated in 
NOGA (2004). 
5 CASE STUDIES 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show results from selected 
1ooN configurations under key assumptions of proof 
test intervals; 14 days stipulated by BSEE and 21 days 
by API Std 53, and of conservative AP BOP element 
failure rate input (see section 4.2). In particular it is 
Figure 3. Illustration of multiphase Markov model 
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noted from the figures that a ML of less than N-1 pro-
duces a fairly constant (‘robust’) PFD value within 
the 70 - 84 day selected mission time. This indicates 
that a decision to postpone repair until the (N-1)th re-
vealed closure element failure may be an option due 
to small impact on the ‘BOP system PFD’. However, 
a careful check of assumptions and analysis with in-
put data relevant to the actual BOP should be per-
formed before making any decisions. Noted is also 
that verification of NOGA (2004) SIL 2 requirements 
appear to be within reach of most BOP system con-
figurations, which is also demonstrated in FTA model 
calculation made by Holand and Awan (2012). 
Steady-state PFD from the model was not produced 
during the case studies with a selected mission time 
of around 70-80 days in spite of relative high input 
failure rates. Care must therefore be taken when de-
ducing AVGPFD  from the model. For example, a high 
impact on the numerical AVGPFD  value is found from 
a strong transient PFD in the first 14 or 21-day inspec-
tion interval. A rule of thumb in the oil and gas indus-
try is to approach safety policy changes from a con-
servative side. Hence, we would suggest that PFD in 
1st interval is neglected when producing AVGPFD  with 
the model. For the case studies, neglecting the first 
inspection interval for AVGPFD  calculations implied 
some 11% to 25% increase in the average value. The 
AVGPFD  increase was highest in cases with small N. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
The boundary conditions for safety and reliability 
analysis of subsea BOP systems have been thor-
oughly discussed on basis of internationally recog-
nised regulations, industry standards and experience 
data collected by the industry. 
A multiphase Markov modelling approach has 
been presented that can be used to explicitly evaluate 
aspects of safety performance and maintenance opti-
misation for typical subsea blowout preventer sys-
tems. Several case studies have been presented to 
demonstrate the application of the approach for typi-
cal BOP system configurations under normal operat-
ing conditions, which are referred to in the paper as 
“Scenario 1a/b” and “Scenario 2”: Isolation of well 
annulus with AP or PR/VBR elements available.  
A main assumption with the approach, a trade-off 
for model simplicity, is that all the BOP closure ele-
ments must have identical failure rates. Experience 
data shows that this can be a valid assumption, but 
same experience data may also be used to argue the 
need to use different failure rates. Hence, it may be of 
particular interest to study the implications of this 
simplification in the model. For example, what are 
benefits to a more detailed model over the simplistic 
alternative and use of sensitivity analysis? 
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